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TAXATION
OVERVIEW

This article discusses and analyzes four cases, each of which revolves around provisions of Subtitle F, Procedure and Administration,
of the Internal Revenue Code.' Two of the cases deal with relatively
new provisions of the Code: section 6702, providing a civil penalty for
frivolous income tax returns, and section 6402(c), mandating interception of tax refunds to reimburse states for child support provided by the
state. In addition, a case in which the civil fraud penalty of section
6653(b) was applied against a tax protester and a case in which a waiver
of tax court jurisdiction under section 6213(d) was allegedly procured
through misrepresentation have been reviewed.
I.

PROTESTING FRIVOLITIES UNDER
BORGESON V.

A.

I.R.C. § 6702:

UNITED STATES

Background

This last year marked the first time that a federal court of appeals
was faced with a challenge to a frivolous return penalty imposed pursuant to I.R.C. § 6702.2 Created by the Tax Equity and Fiscal Responsibility Act of 1982 (TEFRA),3 and effective for returns filed after
September 3, 1982, section 6702 allows the IRS to assess a flat $500
penalty against individual taxpayers filing "purported" returns which
are intentionally made out incorrectly, usually as a protest against the
tax laws. This new penalty may be imposed regardless of whether any
tax is due. The IRS has wasted no time in using its new-found weapon
against individuals who have, in fact, paid all taxes owing (usually because of mandatory withholding by their employers), but have filed protest-type returns, often calculating excessive refunds due them based on
unauthorized deductions.
1. This article concerns tax cases handed down by the Tenth Circuit between June,
1984 and May, 1985, and was completed on June 15, 1985.
2. I.R.C. § 6702 (1985) provides:
(a)

CIVIL PENALTY-If-

(1)

any individual files what purports to be a return of the tax imposed by

subtitle A but which (A) does not contain information on which the substantial
correctness of the self-assessment may be judged, or
(B) contains information that on its face indicates that the
self-assessment is substantially incorrect; and

the conduct referred to in paragraph (1) is due to (A) a position which is frivolous, or
(B) a desire (which appears on the purported return) to delay
or impede the administration of Federal income tax laws, then such
individual shall pay a penalty of $500.
(2)

(b) PENALTY IN ADDITION To OTHER PENALTIES

-

The penalty imposed by sub-

section (a) shall be in addition to any other penalty provided by law.
3. Tax Equity and Fiscal Responsibility Act of 1982, Pub. L. No. 97-248, 96 Stat. 617
(1982).
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Almost two dozen cases challenging the IRS's imposition of this
new penalty have now made their way to the various circuit courts of
appeals. Because deficiency procedures do not apply, 4 all began as refund suits in district courts. Except in one instance, 5 the lower courts
had found that the penalty was properly imposed. All of the appeals
courts found the same, many finding the appeal itself frivolous and assessing costs and attorneys' fees against the taxpayer in addition to the
6
penalty itself.
Section 6702 was enacted to combat the "rapid growth in deliberate
defiance of the tax laws by tax protestors [sic]." 7 Prior to its enactment,
available penalties were tied to the taxpayer's tax liability, so that "if a
taxpayer ha[d] paid at least the correct amount of tax through estimated
tax or wage withholding, there [was] no penalty for filing a protest
return." 8
The new section allows the IRS to assess the $500 civil penalty
whenever the tax return meets two criteria. Section 6702(a)(1) addresses the information provided on the return from which the self-assessed tax liability is calculated. The self-assessed tax must be able to be
calculated from the face of the return. The first criterion of section 6702
is met if the necessary information ismissing 9 or if the information
given indicates that the self-assessment is incorrect.' 0 The second criterion is a mens rea requirement: the incorrectness of the return under section 6702(a)(1) must be due to a frivolous position,'' or a desire to
12
delay or impede the administration of the income tax laws.
To date, the cases dealing with section 6702 at the circuit court
level have involved relatively straight-forward tax protester returns.
Outside of Borgeson v. United States 13 and Thomas v. United States,' 4 the
cases fall neatly into three fact patterns: 1) no information is provided
4. In most situations, when the IRS decides that a taxpayer owes the government
more money, the taxpayer has the option of challenging the decision in tax court without
first paying the disputed amount, provided he strictly complies with a series of specific
procedural prerequisites. Termed "deficiency procedures," this option is not available to
challenge a section 6702 penalty imposition. I.R.C. § 6703(b) (1985). Under section
6703(c)(1), only 15 percent ($75) need be paid, rather than the full penalty (as required by
section 6702), in order for district court jurisdiction to attach. Also, the taxpayer must
timely file a claim for refund after paying the alleged deficiency before he will be allowed
administrative review prior to judicial review. I.R.C. § 6 7 03(c)(2).
5. The district court's decision, reversed by the Ninth Circuit, was unpublished. Jenney v. United States, 755 F.2d 1384 (9th Cir. 1985).
6. See, e.g., Olson v. United States, 760 F.2d 1003 (9th Cir. 1985) (double costs plus
$1,000); Paulson v. United States, 758 F.2d 61 (2d Cir. 1985) (double costs plus $2,500);
Boomer v. United States, 755 F.2d 696 (8th Cir. 1985) (double costs plus $500).
7. S.REP. No. 494, 97th Cong., 2d Sess. 277, reprinted in 1982 U.S. CODE CONG. &
AD. NEWS 781, 1023.

8. Id.
9. I.R.C. § 6702(a)(l)(A) (1985).
10. I.R.C. § 6702(a)(l)(B) (1985).
II. I.R.C. § 6702(a)(2)(A) (1985).
12. I.R.C. § 6702(a)(2)(B) (1985).
13. 757 F.2d 1071 (10th Cir. 1985). See inifra
notes 22-29 and accompanying text.
14. 755 F.2d 728 (9th Cir. 1985) (only issue on appeal being section 6703's time limits for court access).
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on the return (usually asterisks are substituted for correct information); 15 2) a deduction is taken for the taxpayer's own labor; 16 or 3) 17a
"war tax" deduction or credit is taken in protest of military spending.
Three challenges to section 6702 have come before the Tenth Circuit. In Martinez v. IRS 18 and Betz v. United States,' 9 the taxpayers' returns failed to provide any information from which tax liability could be
computed. 20 The taxpayers' fifth amendment violation claims were
summarily dismissed on appeal. 2 1 Borgeson v. United States2 2 involved a
different type of protest.
B.

Borgeson v. United States

In Borgeson, the taxpayer's return was filled in, signed and timely
filed, but the perjury clause of the return (which reads: "Under penalties
of perjury, I declare that I have examined this return, including accompanying schedules and statements, and to the best of my knowledge and
belief, it is true, correct and complete . . .")had been struck. Citing
I.R.C. § 6065,23 which requires a perjury clause on returns, the Tenth
Circuit, in a per curiam opinion, concluded that "[t]he absence of the
verification precludes the IRS from judging the 'substantial correctness'
of the return because the required 'information' that the return has been
verified under 'penalty of perjury' is absent." ' 24 The Tenth Circuit took
the position that the correctness of a self-assessment cannot be judged
25
without the return's perjury clause remaining intact.
15. See Boday v. United States, 759 F.2d 1472 (9th Cir. 1985); Paulson v. United
States, 758 F.2d 61 (2d Cir. 1985); Boomer v. United States, 755 F.2d 696 (8th Cir. 1985);
Betz v. United States, 753 F.2d 834 (10th Cir. 1985); Martinez v. IRS, 744 F.2d 71 (10th
Cir. 1985); Baskin v. United States, 738 F.2d 975 (8th Cir. 1984).
16. See Olson v. United States, 760 F.2d 1003 (9th Cir. 1985); Wardell v. United
States, 757 F.2d 203 (8th Cir. 1985); Anderson v. United States, 754 F.2d 1270 (5th Cir.
1985); Lovell v. United States, 753 F.2d 1077 (7th Cir. 1984); Madison v. United States,
752 F.2d 607 (11th Cir. 1985); Davis v. United States, 742 F.2d 171 (5th Cir. 1984);
Holker v. United States, 737 F.2d 752 (8th Cir. 1984).
17. See Wall v. United States, 756 F.2d 52 (8th Cir. 1985);Jenney v. United States, 755
F.2d 1384 (9th Cir. 1985); Kahn v. United States, 753 F.2d 1208 (3d Cir. 1985); Welch v.
United States, 750 F.2d 1101 (1st Cir. 1985).
18. 744 F.2d 71 (10th Cir. 1984).
19. 753 F.2d 834 (10th Cir. 1985).
20. Neither district court opinion was published and no further description of the
actual returns was given in either court of appeals decision.
21. Betz, 753 F.2d at 835; Martinez, 744 F.2d at 72. The taxpayers claimed that requiring such information violated their privilege against self-incrimination.
22. 757 F.2d 1071 (10th Cir. 1985).
23. I.R.C. § 6065 (1982) provides:
Except as otherwise provided by the Secretary, any return, declaration, statement,
or other document required to be made under any provision of the internal revenue laws or regulation [sic] shall contain or be verified by a written declaration
that it is made under the penalties of perjury.
24. Borgeson, 757 F.2d at 1073 (quoting I.R.C. § 6065).
25. The court went on to describe a return without a perjury clause as a "nullity." Id.
Because section 6702 requires the filing of a "purported" return, the court's language
arguably blurs the distinction, made crucial for certain statutes of limitations purposes
under Badaracco v. Commissioner, 104 S.Ct. 756 (1984), between not filing a return and
filing a false or fraudulent one.
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Although the legislative history2 6 indicates section 6702 was intended to reach tax (or spending) protests such as Martinez and Betz, it is
less clear that section 6702 was intended to reach a struck perjury
clause. Borgeson is the only appellate level decision which addresses tax
return information not used in the calculation of tax liability. This
Tenth Circuit decision has given section 6702(a)(1)(A) its most expansive interpretation to date. In Borgeson, the Tenth Circuit stated that the
substantial correctness of the return could not be judged because of the
struck perjury clause. 27 Section 6702, however, does not specifically address the correctness of the return, but is limited to the correctness of
the self-assessment contained in the return. "[A]lthough the term 'selfassessment' is not given a precise definition in section 6702, it refers to
'the amount of tax shown on the return.'

",28

The Borgeson court stressed the importance of requiring a perjury
clause on the return. "The perjury charge based on a false return has
been deemed 'one of the principal sanctions available to assure that
honest returns are filed.' "29 However, the court's assertion that be-

cause the perjury clause is required, the correctness of the self-assessment cannot be judged without it -

would seem to open the door to

section 6702 penalty assessments based on omissions unrelated to the
calculation of tax liability.
II.

FRIVOLITY TURNED FRAUDULENT UNDER I.R.C. § 6653(b): ZELL V.
COMMISSIONER

30

Lucien Zell, a retired Air Force Colonel, joined the tax protest
movement in 1976. Zell claimed thirteen exemptions on his 1976 withholding exemption certificate (Form W-4), filled in his 1976 and 1977
return with asterisks, and did not file any returns for 1978 or 1979.
Based on the information provided on his 1976 W-4 form, his pension
was paid to him with virtually no with-holding. 3 '

As a result, Zell's pro-

26. S. REP. No. 494, 97th Cong., 2d Sess. 277, reprinted in 1982 U.S. CODE CONG. &
AD. NEWS 781, 1024.
27. Borgeson, 757 F.2d at 1073.
28. Kahn v. United States, 753 F.2d 1208, 1213 (3d Cir. 1985) (quoting S. REP. No.
494, 97th Cong., 2nd Sess. 277, reprintedin 1982 U.S. CODE CONG. & AD. NEWs 781, 1024).
Kahn is a very detailed and thoughtful analysis of the constitutionality of section 6702. It
is the only opinion to address the possibility of an indigent taxpayer, who would be denied
both administrative and judicial review because of inability to pay the $75 penalty. See
supra note 4.
29. Borgeson, 757 F.2d at 1073 (quoting Vaira v. Commissioner, 52 T.C. 986, 1005,
rev'don other grounds, 444 F.2d 770 (3d Cir. 1971)).
30. 763 F.2d 1139 (10th Cir. 1985).
31. I.R.C. § 3402(a)(1) (1976) requires "every employer making payment of wages"
to withhold taxes. I.R.C. § 3401(a) (1976) defines wages as "all remuneration ... for
services performed by an employee for his employer." Treas. Reg. § 31.3401(b)(ii) (1976)
requires withholding on "amounts received as retirement pay for service in the Armed
Forces." Although the employer/employee relationship terminates upon retirement, a
pension in the form of deferred compensation is still considered subject to I.R.C. § 3402's
withholding requirements.
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test took him beyond the frivolous return penalty of I.R.C. § 670232 and
into a tax deficiency assessment situation, from which additions to tax
33
(calculated as a percentage of the tax deficiency) are possible.
An underpayment due to "negligence or intentional disregard of
rules and regulations (but without intent to defraud)" is subject to an
addition to the tax owed of five percent of the underpayment.3 4 An underpayment due to fraud is subject to an addition to the tax owed of fifty
percent of the underpayment. 3 5 Zell was assessed the fifty percent fraud
penalty from which he timely sought a redetermination in tax court.
36
The tax court upheld the assessment.
On appeal, Zell argued that his case was indistinguishable from
Raley v. Commissioner,3 7 in which the Third Circuit found the fifty percent
penalty unwarranted under the facts of that case. The Zell court distinguished Raley based on the numerous letters which Raley had sent to the
various federal agencies and officials, advising them of his refusal to pay
taxes. The Raley court found this evidence diluted the government's
38
case to less than clear and convincing proof of intent to defraud.
Raley also had filed false withholding forms and incomplete tax returns.
The Raley court stated:
Were this the only evidence before us, we might be inclined to
agree with the Government that Raley intended to defraud the
Government. However, also before us are the letters which
Raley wrote and mailed to various federal officials. . . . The
letters

. . .

make it clear that Raley intended to call attention to

his failure to pay taxes. It would be anomalous to suggest that
Raley's numerous attempts to notify the Government are sup39
portive, let alone suggestive, of an intent to defraud.
Zell did not send any letters prior to the IRS commencing its investiga40
tion and thus could not come under Raley.
The Zell court went on to discuss the elements required to find
32. I.R.C. § 6702(2)(A) (1985) allows a flat penalty assessment of $500 for the filing
of frivolous returns. See supra note 2.
33. I.R.C. § 6653 (1985). See infra notes 34-35 for provisions.
34. I.R.C. § 6653(a)(1) (1985) provides as follows:
(a) NEGLIGENCE OR INTENTIONAL DISREGARD OF RULES AND REGULATIONS WITH
RESPECT TO INCOME, GIFT, OR WINDFALL PROFrr TAXES:

(1)

IN GENERAL-If any

part of any underpayment (as defined in subsection (c)(I)) of any tax imposed by
subtitle A, by chapter 12 of subtitle B or by chapter 45 (relating to windfall profit
tax) is due to negligence or intentional disregard of rules or regulations (but
without intent to defraud), there shall be added to the tax an amount equal to 5
percent of the underpayment.
35. I.R.C. § 6653(b)(1) provides as follows:
(b) FRAUD (1) IN GENERAL-If any part of any underpayment (as defined in subsection (c))
of tax required to be shown on a return is due to fraud, there shall be added to
the tax an amount equal to 50 percent of the underpayment.
36. Zell v. Commissioner, T.C.M. 1984-152 (CCH), affid, 763 F.2d 1139 (1985).
37. 676 F.2d 980 (3d Cir. 1982).
38. Raley, 676 F.2d at 983.
39. Id. at 983-84.
40. "In 1978 and 1979, [Zell] neither filed nor disclosed to the IRS that he was not
filing. Thus he was not, as was the petitioner in Raley, openly in defiance of the IRS during
all of the years involved in this dispute." Zell, 763 F.2d at 1145. It is anomalous that a tax
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fraud under section 6653(b). The Tenth Circuit first considered the
conduct required and followed the Fifth and Eighth Circuits in adopting
4
the "affirmative act" test of Spies v. United States. '
In Spies, the taxpayer was convicted of the felony of attempting to
defeat and evade income tax. The Internal Revenue Code section relied
on for the conviction 4 2 had a lesser included offense of willful failure to
pay or file. The Supreme Court found the additional element required
for conviction under the evasion offense, a felony, to be an affirmative
act as opposed to a mere omission (an "attempt" rather than a "failure"). Both offenses required the conduct or omission to be "willful,"
43
since defined by the Supreme Court as meaning intentional.
In 1978 and 1979 Zell did not file any returns and yet was assessed a
fraud penalty on deficiencies for each of these years. The affirmative act
found to warrant imposition of the penalty was Zell's completion of the
withholding certificates (W-4 forms) for the Air Force. 4 4 On determining that the affirmative act test of Spies was thus met, the court then had
to struggle with the mens rea required for this act.
The Spies court was concerned with a criminal offense requiring intent to evade or defeat a tax. The current relevant statute, 45 its lesser
included offenses, and most of the other criminal statutes under the Internal Revenue Code explicitly require willfulness. 4 6 When these criminal statutes address statements made by a defendant, conviction usually
requires these statement to be false or fraudulent. 4 7 Although under the
tax laws intent to evade is often equated with intent to defraud, 48 the
protester trying to avoid a fraud penalty is now encouraged, if not required, to further clog
the system with a deluge of useless letters.
In his concurring opinion,Judge Barrett agreed that the two cases were indistinguishable in their relevant facts, but found Raley itself wrongly decided, believing the penalty
proper in both Zell and Raley. Id. at 1147 (Barrett, J., concurring).
41. 317 U.S. 492 (1943).
42. I.R.C. § 145(b) (1939).
43. The Spies Court had stated: "Willful but passive neglect of the statutory duty may
constitute the lesser offense ...." 317 U.S. at 499. In United States v. Bishop, 412 U.S.
346 (1973), the Court clarified its position:
The Court, in fact, has recognized that the word "willfully" in these statutes generally connotes a voluntary, intentional violation of a known legal duty....
The Court's consistent interpretation of the word "willfully" to require an
element of mens rea implements the pervasive intent of Congress to construct penalties that separate the purposeful tax violator from the well-meaning, but easily
confused, mass of taxpayers.
Id. at 360-61.

44. Zell, 763 F.2d 1145-46.
45. I.R.C. § 7201 (1985).
46. See, e.g., I.R.C. § 7201 (1985) ("Any person who willfully attempts.
); I.R.C.
§ 7202 (1985) ("Any person ... who willfully fails . . .");
I.R.C. § 7203 (1985) ("Any
person . . .who willfully fails. ..");
I.R.C. § 7204 (1985) ("Any person ... who willfully
furnishes . . .or who willfully fails to furnish . ); I.R.C. § 7205 (1985) ("Any individual
who willfully supplies . . .or who willfully fails to supply.
47. See, e.g., I.R.C. § 7204 (1985) ("willfully furnishes a false or fraudulent statement
I.R.C.
.); § 7205(a) (1985) ("who willfully supplies false or fraudulent information
.. "); I.R.C. § 7205(b) (1985) ("who willfully makes . . .any false certification . . .").
48. See H. BALTER &J. GuiDorri, TAX FRAUD AND EVASIONs 2-2 (5th ed. 1983):
Although the revenue statutes provide civil penalties where an underpayment in a
tax return is due to fraud and criminal penalties for a taxpayer "who willfully

1986]

TAXATION
8

only distinction between attempt to evade and willful failure to file made
by the Supreme Court in Spies was the affirmative act, or conduct,
required.
Tax courts have repeatedly found that false withholding certificates
combined with failure to file returns is sufficient proof of fraud for imposition of the fifty percent fraud penalty under section 6653, where the
taxpayers had previously filed proper returns. 4 9 However, little discussion has been given in these cases to whether the taxpayer must be
found to have intended to deceive or merely intended to make a
misrepresentation.
The Tenth Circuit has twice addressed this distinction under a criminal statute of the Internal Revenue Code. In both United States v.
Smith 50 and United States v. Hudler,5 1 the defendants were convicted of

willfully supplying false or fraudulent information to their employers on
their withholding certificates. 52 In both cases, the Tenth Circuit affirmed the convictions: -[t]he criterion is not whether the employer and
the government were, or could have been, deceived. The crime is the
willful furnishing of false or fraudulent information." '5 3 It was "incumbent upon the government to establish only that [defendant] had will' 54
fully supplied false information.
The common law definition of fraud requires intent that another rely
upon one's misrepresentation. 5 5 The civil penalty statute in Zell speaks
attempts in any manner to evade or defeat any tax," one is unable to find any
definition of these terms in the statutes. In practice, the two concepts are the
same, and the courts do not hesitate to use the terms fraud and evasion interchangeably and cumulatively.
49. Wilhelm v. Commissioner, T.C.M. 1984-296 (CCH); Bratton-Bey v. Commissioner, T.C.M. 1982-19 (CCH); Best v. Commissioner, T.C.M. 1981-251 (CCH); Cook v.
Commissioner, T.C.M. 1980-415 (CCH). For similar holdings without mention of previous filing of returns by taxpayers, see Zozoya v. Commissioner, T.C.M. 1985-60 (CCH);
Gregory v. Commissioner, T.C.M. 1985-62 (CCH); Rogers v. Commissioner, T.C.M.
1984-116 (CCH).
50. 484 F.2d 8 (10th Cir. 1973), cert. denied, 415 U.S. 978 (1974).
51. 605 F.2d 488 (10th Cir. 1979).
52. I.R.C. § 7205(a) provides:
(a) WITHHOLDING ON WAGEs-Any individual required to supply information to
his employer under section 3402 who willfully supplies false or fraudulent information, or who willfully fails to supply information thereunder which would require an increase in the tax to be withheld under section 3402, shall, in addition

to any other penalty provided by law, upon conviction thereof, be fined not more
than $1,000, or imprisoned not more than I year, or both.
53. Hudler, 605 F.2d at 490.
54. Smith, 484 F.2d at 10. In Smith, the indictment itself read "false and fraudulent."
Id. at 8 (emphasis added); see also United States v. Smith, 487 F.2d 329 (9th Cir. 1973), cert.
denied, 416 U.S. 989 (1974); United States v.Malinowski, 472 F.2d 850 (3d Cir.), cert. denied,
411 U.S. 970 (1973); cf. United States v. Snider, 502 F.2d 645 (4th Cir. 1974) (Conviction
under the same statute was reversed, the court finding the term "false" in the statute to
require deceptiveness. The defendant had claimed three billion allowances on his withholding certificate.).
55. Fraud is defined as "an intentional perversion of truth for the purpose of inducing
another in reliance upon it to part with some valuable thing belonging to him or to surrender a legal right," BLACK's LAW DICTIONARY 788 (4th ed. 1968), and as "anything calculated to deceive another to his prejudice and accomplishing the purpose," BALArerNE'S
LAw DICTIONARY 497 (3d ed. 1969).

DENVER UNIVERSITY L W REVIEW

[Vol. 63:2

only to fraud; 5 6 it does not address willfully making false statements.
The Zell court quoted two definitions of the required state of mind.
First, it quoted a definition of fraud from Mitchell v. Commissioner :57
" '[t]he intent required is the specific purpose to evade a tax believed to
be owing.' "58 The defendant in Mitchell filed a false return and argued
on appeal that the evidence established only negligence. The defendant
conceded the government's allegation that he filed the returns "with the
59
intent that they should be accepted as true and correct."
In the same paragraph, the Zell court redefined the required state of
mind as "one which, 'if translated into action, is well calculated to cheat
or deceive the government.' ",60 The text of the quoted treatise first
states: "Generally speaking, there must be an intent to mislead or defraud before the [fraud] penalty can be imposed. . . .The first and basic element in fraud is a fraudulent intent .... ",61
In considering imposition of the fraud penalty, it would seem that
not only must the issue of intent versus negligence be addressed, but
also the issue of intent to deceive versus intent to make a false statement, without the intent that the statement be relied upon. These distinctions are particularly important in light of the increasing frequency
62
of tax protest activity.
In Zell, the Tenth Circuit found that an affirmative act which is an
intentional misrepresentation is per se fraudulent under section 6653.
"[The taxpayer] filed false W-4 forms, thus committing an 'affirmative
act' of misrepresentation sufficient to justify the fraud penalty." '6 3 If this
language is limited to the facts of the case, the common law definition of
fraud could be met as well. The taxpayer's misrepresentation was not
obviously incorrect (he claimed thirteen exemptions) and nothing on
the withholding certificates indicated that his statements were false.
Thus it could be found that he intended that the misrepresentation be
relied upon, but nothing in the opinion indicated that this was of import.
III.

THE

VALIDITY OF A WAIVER UNDER

I.R.C. § 6213(d):

ARDALIAN V' UNITED STATES

A.

Background

Under present tax law, there are two avenues (plus a safety valve)
for obtaining judicial review of disputes between taxpayers and the IRS.
The first is through the tax courts, which were created by legislation and
56.

I.R.C. § 6653(b) (1985).

See supra note 35.

57. 118 F.2d 308 (5th Cir. 1941).
58. Zell, 763 F.2d at 1143 (quoting Mitchell, 118 F.2d at 310).
59. Mitchell, 118 F.2d at 309.
60. Zell, 763 F.2d at 1143 (quoting 10 MERTENS, LAW OF FEDERAL INCOME TAXATION

§ 55.10, at 46 (1984)).
61.

10 MERTENS, § 55.10, at 46.

62. See, e.g., United States v.Snider, 502 F.2d 645 (4th Cir. 1974); see also supra note
54.
63. Zell, 763 F.2d at 1146.
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are now under article I of the United States Constitution. 64 To get into
tax court, both the taxpayer and the IRS must take action. The IRS
must initially send a notice of deficiency to the taxpayer; then the taxpayer must petition the tax court for a redetermination of this deficiency
within ninety days of when the notice was mailed. 6 5 Each of these ac66
tions is an independent prerequisite to tax court jurisdiction.
The other avenue is through the federal district courts, whose basic
jurisdiction in the federal tax arena is set forth in 28 U.S.C. § 1346.67
In Flora v. United States,68 the Supreme Court found this section to mean
that "full payment of the assessment is a jurisdictional prerequisite to
suit."' 69 Thus, if a taxpayer is able to pay the full amount of the deficiency assessed and then makes a timely claim for refund from the IRS
which is denied, 70 he may properly invoke district court jurisdiction
without any action needed from the IRS.
Collection of a disputed deficiency may not commence until an assessment has been made. 7 ' An assessment may not be made until a notice of deficiency has been mailed to the taxpayer and ninety days have
lapsed without the taxpayer filing a petition in tax court. 7 2 Thus,
although the IRS is not required to mail a notice of deficiency, 7 3 in order to collect it must ordinarily do so. A safety valve is provided by
I.R.C. § 6213(a) 74 which states that if an assessment is made without the
required statutory notice and waiting period, one may seek injunctive
75
relief in district court to prohibit collection.
If a taxpayer does not dispute the deficiency determined, there is
nothing to prevent him from simply agreeing that the deficiency is cor64. I.R.C. § 7441 (1985).
65. I.R.C. § 6213 (1985). The taxpayer has 150 days if the notice is addressed to a
person outside the United States.
66. Musso v. Commissioner, 531 F.2d 772 (5th Cir. 1976) (notice of deficiency prerequisite); DaBoul v. Commissioner, 429 F.2d 38 (9th Cir. 1970) (same); Healy v. Commissioner, 351 F.2d 602 (9th Cir. 1965) (timely filing of petition prerequisite); Vibro Mfg. Co.,
Inc. v. Commissioner, 312 F.2d 253 (2d Cir. 1963) (same).
67. 28 U.S.C. § 1346(a)(1) (1985) provides:
(a) The district courts shall have original jurisdiction,
concurrent with the United States Court of Claims, of:
(1) Any civil action against the United States for the recovery of any internal-revenue tax alleged to have been erroneously or illegally assessed or collected, or any penalty claimed to have been collected without authority or any
sum alleged to have been excessive or in any manner wrongfully collected under
the internal-revenue laws.
68. 362 U.S. 145 (1960).
69. Id. at 146.
70. See I.R.C. § 7422(a) (1985).
71. I.R.C. § 6632 (1985).
72. I.R.C. § 6213(a) (1985).
73. I.R.C. § 6212 (1985) only authorizes notices of deficiency.
74. I.R.C. § 6213(a) (1985) provides in pertinent part:
Notwithstanding the provisions of section 7421(a) [the Anti-Injunction statute],
the making of such assessment or the beginning of such proceeding or levy during the time such prohibition is in force may be enjoined by a proceeding in the
proper court.
75. See United States v. Yellow Cab Co., 90 F.2d 699 (7th Cir. 1937); Dierks v. United
States, 215 F. Supp. 338 (S.D.N.Y. 1963); United States v. Williams, 161 F. Supp. 158
(E.D.N.Y. 1958); Dorsey v. United States, 84-2 U.S. Tax Cas.
9643 (D. Cal.).
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rect. One of the goals of an IRS auditor is to reach an agreement with
the taxpayer as to the deficiency. 76 If the taxpayer agrees to the deficiency, one of several forms is drawn up which explicitly states that the
77
taxpayer is consenting to the immediate assessment of the deficiency.
If signed, the taxpayer waives his right to a deficiency notice. In this
manner, the IRS can obtain an assessment, allowing collection to commence, without the issuance of a deficiency notice. 78 Without a deficiency notice, the taxpayer cannot seek tax court review and must prepay the deficiency for district court jurisdiction should he later wish to
contest the deficiency. By signing the waiver, the taxpayer has cut off
one possible avenue of judicial review of any subsequent tax dispute.
B.

Ardalan v. United States

In Ardalan v. United States, 79 a waiver of deficiency notice had been
executed, but the taxpayers claimed they had been misled into signing
it. 80 The taxpayers did not petition the tax court for a redetermination,
though a notice of deficiency had been sent, 8 t presumably assuming the
waiver prohibited this. Nor did they pre-pay the deficiency before seeking district court relief.8 2 Their claim was for refund of the taxes they

had paid and abatement of the deficiency assessed. The Tenth Circuit
found that the district court had been without jurisdiction to consider
83
the matter without full prepayment under Flora.
In addition to the claim that they had been misled into signing the
waiver, the taxpayers in Ardalan claimed they were not subject to United
76. "Upon completion of an examination, the examiner will explain the basis of the
proposed adjustments to the taxpayer. . . and make an effort to obtain an agreement to
the proposed tax liability." INTERNAL REVENUE MANUAL, Part IV, Audit: Income Tax, Ch

4200 § 4240, Instructions to Examiners, 424(12).1(2), Soliciting Agreements (11-2-81), at
7309-225(CCH).
77. Form 4549 is used for field audits, Form 1902 for office audits. Each lists changes
made of items calculated on an original return for a particular year. Form 870 does not
include a break-out of items, and may include more than one taxable year. Every one of
the forms contains a consent provision immediately above the signature line for the taxpayer which reads similar to that found on Form 1902-B:
I do not wish to exercise my appeal rights with the Internal Revenue Service or to
contest in the United States Tax Court the findings in this report. Therefore, I
consent to either: (1)The immediate assessment and collection of the balance
due shown ....

or (2) the overpayment shown ....

78. Associated Mutuals, Inc. v. Delaney, 176 F.2d 179 (1st Cir. 1949).
79. 748 F.2d 1411 (10th Cir. 1984).
80. Id. at 1412.
81. Curiously, neither opinion gives the date when the notice of deficiency was sent.
The waiver was signed on August 5, 1979, 149 days after the IRS, on March 9, 1979,
"notified the [taxpayers] that they owed an additional $3,852 in taxes for the year 1977."
Id. at 1412. Presumably this notice was a "30-day letter" which usually precedes the issuance of the statutory deficiency notice, or "90-day letter." If the notice was sent after the
waiver, the taxpayers would have a strong case of deprivation of property without any legal
process if the waiver was a result of misrepresentations made by government officials.
82. Ardalan v. United States, 534 F. Supp. 721 (D. Colo. 1982). Apparently, there
were two district court opinions. In the published decision of Judge Kane, the government's motion to dismiss was granted in part and denied in part. The appeal to the Tenth
Circuit, however, was by the taxpayers from a dismissal with prejudice of their suit for
refund and the granting of summary judgment in favor of the United States.
83. Ardalan, 748 F.2d at 1414. See supra note 67.
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States income taxation. 8 4 Judge Kane of the United States District
Court for the District of Colorado discussed the requirements of Flora,
but found them inapplicable. "Here, unlike Flora, the plaintiffs are not
challenging the amount of tax that the IRS claims they owe; they are
'85
instead challenging the determination they they owe any tax at all."

The district court found this situation sufficiently distinguishable from
Flora8 6 to warrant an exception to the full pre-payment requirement.
Judge Kane dismissed the plaintiff's claim for abatement, relying generally on the Anti-Injunction statute, 8 7 but retained jurisdiction to consider the claim for refund.
The Tenth Circuit disagreed. The taxpayers in Ardalan had paid
$215 in taxes when they filed a joint income tax return for the year in
question. The IRS had subsequently determined that they owed not
only the taxes paid, but several thousand dollars more. By claiming a
refund of the $215 paid, the taxpayers were attempting to split an indivisible tax liability, just as the taxpayer in Flora had. The entire amount
in dispute had to be paid before the district court could entertain any
challenges to its validity. 8 8

The Tenth Circuit then discussed the taxpayers' claim that they
were being unconstitutionally deprived of all judicial forums, having
been misled into signing a waiver of tax court jurisdiction, and not having the funds to pre-pay the deficiency determined. 89 The court addressed this claim as "without merit," citing White v. Commissioner90 as
authority. In White, the IRS already had collected the disputed amount
and the suit was thus a legitimate suit for refund under 28 U.S.C.
§ 1346(a). The taxpayer in White had claimed that her waiver had been
nullified by an accompanying letter stating she was consenting under
protest. The White court had found the waiver to be valid, stating "[t]he
plaintiff cites no authority to support her contention that the effect of
the letter was to compel the IRS to disregard her signature on the
form." 9'
On its face, this statement would indicate the validity of a
waiver will be determined from the four corners of the waiver only. It
84. Ardalan, 748 F.2d at 1412. The taxpayers were Iranian citizens during the taxable
year, though they had been registered as permanent residents of the United States prior to

the tax year. Id.
85. Ardalan, 534 F. Supp. at 725.
86. In Flora, the issue was whether certain losses were ordinary or capital in nature.

The IRS recharacterized the losses as capital and determined a deficiency based on the
recharacterization. The taxpayer paid part of this deficiency and then filed suit in district
court under 28 U.S.C. § 1346 for a refund of the partial payment he had made. Flora, 362
U.S. at 147.
87. The Anti-Injunction statute, I.R.C. § 7421(a) (1985) provides:
(a) TAx-

Except as provided in sections 6212(a) and (c), 6213(a), 6672(b), 6694(c),
7426(a) and (b)(1), and 7429(b), no suit for the purpose of restraining the assessment or collection of any tax shall be maintained in any court by any person,
whether or not such person is the person against whom such tax was assessed.
88. Ardalan, 748 F.2d at 1414.
89. Id.
90. 537 F. Supp. 679 (D. Colo. 1982).
91. While, 537 F. Supp. at 686.
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would appear, however, that whether tax court jurisdiction was or was
not denied by the waiver was moot and unnecessary to a determination
of the taxpayer's refund claim.
In Ardalan, if the waiver was indeed induced by misrepresentations,
and if waivers are to be taken at face value, the taxpayers were, in fact,
denied access to the tax court for at least a portion of the statutory period to which they were entitled after the notice of deficiency had been
sent. 9 2 Contrary to the facts in White, irreparable harm from this denial
would be a possibility; the taxpayers in Ardalan could neither obtain district court review without full payment nor approach the tax court because of the waiver. Both of these conclusions were reached by the
Ardalan court itself. The court stated: "[A] taxpayer cannot claim a constitutional deprivation if he/she permits the statutory time for filing such
an appeal in the Tax Court to expire . . . . The same may be said of a
waiver .... .. 93 The court seemed to miss the taxpayers' contention
that they had been misled into signing the waiver. The court stated that
it was not considering the effectiveness of the waiver; the only issue was
whether the district court had jurisdiction. This jurisdictional issue was
determined solely by whether full prepayment of the deficiency had
94
been made before bringing suit.
It would not appear that the taxpayers urged jurisdiction under
I.R.C. § 6213(a). 9 5 The Tenth Circuit decision does not mention the
possibility, though the district court opinion does state: "The government correctly asserts that the Anti-Injunction statute prohibits this
court from considering plaintiff's abatement request." 9 6
As a decision on 28 U.S.C. § 1346(a)(1) jurisdiction, the court properly found none to exist without full prepayment. The suit, however,
was also for abatement of the deficiency. The plaintiffs claimed access to
the tax court had been denied by a waiver induced by misrepresentations. As to this claim, the court first seemed to agree with the taxpayers
that the waiver had barred tax court jurisdiction, but then, went on to
disclaim any consideration of whether the waiver was or was not effective. 9 7 Other district courts have considered the effectiveness of such
waivers without prepayment in suits for injunctive relief against assessments. These decisions have been reviewed on the merits by appellate
courts.

98

The Ardalan court stated that "[b]ecause consideration of this
threshold jurisdictional issue [the 28 U.S.C. § 1346(a)(1) prepayment
requirement] disposes of this appeal, this court does not need to ad92. See supra note 80.
93. Ardalan, 748 F.2d at 1414.
94. Id.
95. See supra note 73.
96. 534 F. Supp. 721, 722 (D. Colo. 1984); see also supra note 86.
97. 748 F.2d at 1414 (citing White, 537 F. Supp. at 683-84).
98. See, e.g., Philadelphia & Reading Corp. v. Beck, 676 F.2d 1159 (7th Cir. 1982);
Wheeler v. Holland, 218 F.2d 482 (5th Cir. 1955); Associated Mutuals, Inc. v. Delaney,
176 F.2d 179 (1st Cir. 1949).

TAXATION

1986]

dress the other issues on appeal raised by the [taxpayer]." 99 One of
these other issues was the allegation of unconstitutional deprivation of
access to eitherjudicial or administrative courts because of misrepresentations by the IRS inducing a waiver of tax court jurisdiction. The court
refused to consider whether the waiver was, in fact, induced by misrepresentations. It also failed to state whether the waiver would be effective
to bar tax court jurisdiction if it were induced by misrepresentations. 0 0
Both issues would seem to require disposition before declaring the
claim of deprivation of all judicial forums to be without merit.
IV.
A.

DIVVYING UP OF CHILD SUPPORT UNDER I.R.C.
RUCKER V. SECRETARY OF THE TREASURY

§ 6402(c):

Background

A young couple gets married and has a child, but things do not go
well and a divorce soon follows. The wife, the custodial parent, applies
for welfare and, in order to qualify, assigns her rights to child support
from her former husband to the state.' 0 ' Meanwhile, the husband has
remarried and has a child by his new wife. The new couple, because
they have a child and earn little money, qualify for the earned income
credit (EIC). 10 2 They must file a joint income tax return to get the
EIC. 10 3 Meanwhile, the state, supporting the first child through Aid to
Families with Dependent Children (AFDC) payments, has notified the
IRS of its claim to the husband's tax refund. 10 4 The full refund is
mailed to the state and the new couple is sent a notice of the action
instead of a check for the refund.
This scenario has been presented to four federal district courts' 0 5
since Congress authorized the tax-intercept program in 1981.106 Three
10 7
of these cases have been reviewed by the circuit courts of appeals.
Each court which has considered the matter has struggled valiantly to
99. Ardalan, 748 F.2d at 1413.
100. The court's use of the White decision would indicate, if anything, that a waiver is to
be assessed only by its facial validity in determining whether tax court jurisdiction has
been effectively waived. See also Boger v. Commissioner, T.C.M. 1981-629 (CCH) (where
the tax court found that it had no jurisdiction to consider the taxpayer's allegations of
illegal conduct by a government official).
101. 42 U.S.C. § 602(a)(26) (1982).
102. I.R.C. § 43 (1985).
103. I.R.C. § 43(d) (1985).
104. 42 U.S.C. § 664(a) (1985).
105. Coughlin v. Regan, 584 F. Supp. 697 (D. Me. 1984); Nelson v. Regan, 560 F.
Supp. 1101 (D. Conn. 1983), afd, 731 F.2d 105 (2d Cir.), cert. denied, 105 S. Ct. 175
(1984); Sorenson v. Secretary of Treasury, 557 F. Supp. 729 (W.D. Wash. 1982), afd, 752
F.2d 1433 (9th Cir.), cert. granted, 105 S. Ct. 3475 (1985); Rucker v. Secretary of Treasury,
555 F. Supp. 1051 (D. Colo. 1983), rev'd, 751 F.2d 351 (10th Cir. 1984).
106. Omnibus Reconciliation Act of 1981, Pub. L. No. 97-35,§§ 2321, 2331, 2332,
2336, 95 Stat. 860 (codified at 42 U.S.C. §§ 602, 654, 657, 664 (1982) and 26 U.S.C.
§ 6402 (1982)).
107. Sorenson v. Secretary of Treasury, 752 F.2d 1433 (9th Cir.), cert. ganted, 105 S.
Ct. 3475 (1985); Rucker v. Secretary of Treasury, 751 F.2d 351 (10th Cir. 1984); Nelson v.
Regan, 731 F.2d 105 (2d Cir. 1984), cert. denied, 105 S. Ct. 175 (1984).
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sort out the myriad constitutional and jurisdictional issues involved,10 8
with very little guidance provided by the new law itself.
The Tenth and Second Circuits found that the tax-intercept program does apply to EICs in Rucker v. Secretary of Treasury 10 9 and Nelson v.
Regan," l0 respectively. The Ninth Circuit has subsequently disagreed in
Sorenson v. United States. II I
At issue is section 2331 of The Omnibus Budget Reconciliation Act
of 1981 (OBRA). 1 2 The entire section is one page long, adding provisions to title 42 dealing with AFDC'" 3 and to I.R.C. § 6402 dealing with
overpayments and refunds. The OBRA additions require the Secretary
of the Treasury to remit certain refunds to a state which provides AFDC
payments to support a child, rather than to the delinquent non-custodial
4
parent taxpayer.' 1
B.

Legislative History

Concerned with the ever-rising national welfare rolls, Congress, in
1974, considered various proposals which would give both states and
individuals incentives to look beyond the federal coffers for needed
funding of basic living expenses of the poor. Congress considered two
incentives for individuals with children. At the time, four out of five
AFDC recipients were single parents whose partners were neither in the
home nor sending support payments for the care of their child.' 1 5 In
108. These issues include: 1) whether the notice was sufficient; 2) whether due process
requires a pre-deprivation hearing; 3) whether it is the state or federal government's responsibility to provide either; 4) whether both spouses have an interest in an EIC or
whether it is divisible into portions; 5) whether a spouse has standing to assert his/her
partner's rights; 6) whether a claim for refund and IRS denial or the passage of six months
is a prerequisite to a refund suit; 7) whether the Anti-Injunction and Declaratory Judgment
Acts relating to tax cases apply; 8) whether the state or the federal government is the
proper defendant; 9) whether sovereign immunity has been waived; and 10) whether the
eleventh amendment prohibits refund suits.
109. 751 F.2d 351 (10th Cir. 1984).
110. 731 F.2d 105 (2d Cir. 1984), cert. denied, 105 S. Ct. 175 (1985).
111. 752 F.2d 1433 (9th Cir.), cert. granted, 105 S. Ct. 3475 (1985).
112. See supra note 106.
113. See 42 U.S.C. § 664 (1982) ("Collection of past-due support from Federal tax
refunds").
114. 42 U.S.C. § 664(a) (1982) provides in part:
Upon receiving notice from a State agency . . . that a named individual owes
past-due support which has been assigned to such State . . . the Secretary of the
Treasury shall determine whether any amounts, as refunds of Federal taxes paid,
are payable to such individual (regardless of whether such individual filed a tax
return as a married or unmarried individual). If the Secretary of the Treasury
finds that any such amount is payable, he shall withhold from such refunds an
amount equal to the past-due support, and pay such amount to the State agency
I.R.C. § 6402(c) (1982) provides in part:
(C)

OFFSET OF PAST-DUE SUPPORT AGAINST OVERPAYMENTS -

The amount of any overpayment to be refunded to the person making the overpayment shall be reduced by the amount of any past-due support . . . owed by
that person of which the Secretary has been notified by a State. . . . The Secretary shall remit the amount by which the overpayment is so reduced to the State
to which such support has been assigned . ...
115. S. REP. No. 1356, 93d Cong., 2d Sess. 42, reprintedin 1974 U.S. CODE CONG. & AD.
NEws

8133, 8145.

STA XA TION

1986]

most cases, such support was a legal right of the custodial parent (actually of the child), which Congress felt was not being adequately drawn
upon by the then-present system. 116 By transferring this right from an
indigent single parent to a state agency, it was felt the collection process
in place would be more readily utilized."i 7 Thus, an additional requirement was added for a state's AFDC program to qualify for federal
matching funds. The requirement stated that these programs now had
to "provide that, as a condition of eligibility for aid, each applicant or
recipient will be required . . . to assign the State any rights to support
from any other person such applicant may have .....
118 The federal
and state governments would divide any reimbursements so received. 19
Another incentive considered 120 was a limited negative income tax
to compensate, in part, for the social security taxes paid by low-income
earners supporting children.121 Social security taxes are a flat tax with
no minimum cut-off' 2 2 and were thus felt to provide a disincentive to
working as opposed to receiving tax-free welfare support. Termed an
earned income credit (EIC), this provision did not survive conference
committee scrutiny in 1974, but was enacted in the Tax Reduction Act
of 1975.123 As the Senate Report stated: "[T]he most significant objective of the provision should be to assist in encouraging people to obtain
employment, reducing the unemployment rate and reducing the welfare
rolls."1 24 As the credit is available only to custodial parents,1 2 5 the target group is largely AFDC recipients.
The OBRA revisions unfortunately produced a conflict between the
state and individual incentives previously created by the assignment of
child support and EIC provisions respectively. The intent of section
2231 of OBRA was to take advantage of a collection vehicle already existing in the Internal Revenue Code, bypass the taxpayer as to any refund due him, and apply this refund directly to the debt owed by the
12 6
taxpayer to the state.
When the taxpayer's refund includes an EIC, the federal government is providing an EIC to a recipient and for a purpose unintended by
Congress when it created the EIC. It is arguable that with the bitterness
often accompanying domestic separations, the application of EICs to
past-due child support is more of a disincentive to work than is the with116. Id. at 8149.
117. Id. at 8152.
118. 42 U.S.C. § 602(a)(26)(A) (1982).
119. 42 U.S.C. § 658(a) (1982).
120. The incentive was actually reconsidered. This was the third year the Senate approved this provision. The earned income credit was finally enacted the following year.
See infra note 122.
121. S. REP. No. 1356, supra note 114, at 8134.
122. I.R.C. § 3101 (1974).
123. Pub. L. No. 94-12, § 204, 89 Stat. 30 (1975) (codified at 26 U.S.C. § 43 (1976)).
124. S. REP. No. 36, 94th Cong., 1st Sess., reprinted in 1975 U.S. CODE CONG. & AD.
NEWS 54, 84.

125. I.R.C. § 43(c)(1)(B) (1975).
126.

S. REP. No. 139, 97th Cong., IstSess. 521, reprinted in 1981 U.S. CODE CONG. &

AD. NEws 396, 787.
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27
holding of social security taxes.1
Unfortunately, the position of the tax-intercept amendments in
OBRA indicates that EICs are to be included in the tax-intercept program. The new subsection (c) of I.R.C. § 6402 begins: "The amount of
any overpayment to be refunded to the person making the overpayment
shall be reduced by the amount of any past-due support .... ." This
language dovetailed with then-existing subsection (a) which provided:
"[I]n the case of any overpayment, the Secretary . . . may credit the
amount of such overpayment . . . against any liability in respect of an
internal revenue tax . . . and shall refund any balance to such
28
person."1
The term "overpayment" is defined in I.R.C. § 6401. This section
was amended in the legislation creating the EIC to include EICs. EICs
have ever since been explicitly included in the term "overpayments" by
section 6401.129 Congress did not amend section 6401 when it created
the tax-intercept program, nor has it done so since then.

C.

The Case Law

The first federal court of appeals to consider whether EICs are sub30
ject to the tax intercept program was the Second Circuit in Nelson.'
The district court held that Congress had not intended EICs to be included in the tax intercept program, 13 1 and the Second Circuit agreed.
When Rucker 13 2 came up to the Tenth Circuit, Nelson had been decided,
but two other district court opinions had found the opposite Congressional intent. The United States District Court for the Western District
of Washington, in Sorenson v. Secretary of Treasury,13 3 followed the plain
meaning rationale and the United States District Court for the District of
Maine, in Coughlin v. Regan, 's4 found the EIC to be divisible, with only
the obligated spouse's "portion" of the EIC subject to being
intercepted.
127. "[T]he Secretary shall . . . notify the person making the overpayment that so
much of the overpayment as was necessary to satisfy his obligation for past-due support
has been paid to the State." I.R.C. § 6402(c) (1981).
128. I.R.C. § 6402(c) (1981); I.R.C. § 6402(a) (1982).
129. "[I]f the amount allowable as credits under subpart C of part IV of subchapter A
of chapter 1 (relating to refundable credits) exceeds the tax imposed by subtitle A ....
the amount of such excess shall be considered an overpayment." I.R.C. § 6401(b)(1)
(1985). The earned income credit, section 43, is under the subpart C referenced.
130. 731 F.2d 105 (2d Cir. 1984), cert. denied, 105 S. Ct. 175 (1985).
131. Nelson v. Regan, 560 F. Supp. 1101 (D. Conn. 1983),afd, 731 F.2d 105 (2d Cir.),
cert. denied, 105 S. Ct. 175 (1984).
132. Rucker v. Secretary of Treasury, 751 F.2d 351 (10th Cir. 1984), rev k 555 F. Supp.
1051 (D. Colo. 1983). See also supra text accompanying note 105.
133. 557 F. Supp. 729 (W.D. Wash. 1982), affid, 752 F.2d 1433 (9th Cir.), cert. granted,
105 S. Ct. 3475 (1985).
134. 584 F. Supp. 697 (D. Me. 1984).

1986]
D.

TAXATION

Rucker v. Secretary of Treasury

The Colorado federal district court which heard Rucker13 5 did not
get past the jurisdictional question. The plaintiff, the new wife of the
obligated father, sought declaratory and injunctive relief, despite having
received her "portion" of the refund after having brought suit. Judge
Kane found that the case had been rendered moot by the plaintiffs ultimate receipt of a refund and dismissed the suit for lack of a case or
36
controversy. 1
On appeal, the Tenth Circuit reversed and remanded. For a married couple to take advantage of an EIC they must file a joint return.
The EIC is based on the couple's combined earnings.' 3 7 The court,
through Judge Seymour, found the full EIC due to a couple to be an
interest of the couple as a family unit.' 3 8 As such, either spouse had
standing to sue for any portion of the EIC which had been intercepted.
In this case, a portion of the EIC due plaintiff's family unit had been
intercepted; thus, the plaintiff had standing on behalf of the family unit,
despite having received her "portion" from the IRS.
The Tenth Circuit then, in a rather summary fashion, dispensed
with the remaining jurisdictional queries, finding the restraints surrounding tax cases inapplicable to a tax-intercept suit. "The intercept
program operates only after tax assessment and collection, when the
federal government ceases to have an interest in the tax refunds.
[P]laintiff's claims for earned income credit benefits are not barred by
sections 7422(a) and 6532 of the Internal Revenue Code."' 3 9 These
sections both concern jurisdiction to hear a taxpayer's claim for a refund.14 0 Plaintiff's claim, however, was for "declaratory and injunctive
relief."' 14 ' Neither the Anti-Injunction Acti 4 2 nor the Declaratory Judgment Act,' 4 3 each of which restricts district court jurisdiction in tax
cases, was mentioned by the court. 144
135. Rucker v. Secretary of Treasury, 555 F. Supp. 1051 (D. Colo. 1983), rev'd, 751
F.2d 351 (10th Cir. 1984).
136.

Rucker, 555 F. Supp. at 1053.

137.
138.
139.
140.
(a)

Treas. Reg. § 1.43-2(d) (1980).
Rucker, 751 F.2d at 355.
Id. at 356.
I.R.C. § 7422(a) (1982) provides:
No SUIT PRIOR TO FILING CLAIM FOR REFUND--

No suit or proceeding shall

be maintained in any court for the recovery of any internal revenue tax alleged to
have been erroneously or illegally assessed or collected, or of any penalty claimed
to have been collected without authority, or of any sum alleged to have been
excessive or in any manner wrongfully collected, until a claim for refund or credit
has been duly filed with the Secretary, according to the provisions of law in that
regard, and the regulations of the Secretary established in pursuance thereof.
I.R.C. § 6532 (1982) concerns periods of limitation on suits by taxpayers for refund (subsection (a), six months from date of required filing of claim for refund), by the United
States for recovery of erroneous refunds (subsection (b)), and by persons other than taxpayers (subsection (c), 9 to 12 months from date of levy or request for return of property).
141. Rucker, 751 F.2d at 353.
142. I.R.C. § 7421(a) (1982).
143. 28 U.S.C. § 2201 (1982).
144. Contra Vidra v. Egger, 575 F. Supp. 1305 (E.D. Pa. 1982) (suit for refund after
filing claim sole remedy). But see Nelson v. Regan, 731 F.2d 105 (2d Cir.) (both restraints
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The Tenth Circuit then went on to discuss the merits of the case,
specifically whether Congress intended EICs to be subject to the taxintercept program. In so doing, the court determined that either spouse
has standing to bring suit for any portion of an EIC withheld from a
joint return, that the transfer of EICs by the IRS to parties other than
the taxpayers may be challenged by a suit for injunctive and declaratory
relief against the United States government, and that a claim for refund
14 5
is not a necessary prerequisite to such suit.

The Tenth Circuit's finding that EICs are not subject to the taxintercept program may well be a true reflection of Congressional intent.
The actual language of the Code, however, requires the opposite result.
The tax-intercept amendment to the Code is written in mandatory terms
to the Secretary of the Treasury. The use of the word "overpayment" in
the amendment, as well as its placement in the Code, makes EICs specifically included by existing Code definitions. The Tenth Circuit decision,
rational as it may be, would seem to add to the confusion. In jurisdictions where the issue has not been adjudicated or where a court has
followed the plain meaning of the Code provisions, 14 6 the IRS is required to withhold EICs. On the other hand, in jurisdictions where a
court has determined that Congress did not intend for a new provision
to be read in conjunction with an old one, the IRS is required not to
withhold them.
Diane K. Young

only applicable where tax liability at issue), rert. deied. 105 S. Ct. 175 (1984); Sorenson v.
Secretary ofTreasury. 752 F.2d 1433 (9th Cir.), cert. granted, 105 S. Ct. 3475 (1985) (same
holding concerning Declaratory Judgment Act).
145. Neither spouse had filed a claim for refund of the husband's "'portion" of the EIC.
l'he wife's "portion" had been refunded after she liled a claim for such with the IRS.
Rucker. 751 F.2d at 355.
146. Sorenson v. Secretary of [reasury. 752 F.2d 1433 (9th Cir.), cerl. gratied, 105 S.
Ct. 3475 (1985).

